Immigration and National Security Report

As I promised, here are some of the highlights from the report by the non-partisan Migration Policy Institute.

Our new security measures must be effective rather than merely dramatic, and must not destroy what we are trying to defend. The government’s post-September 11 immigration measures have failed these tests.

These actions have not only done great harm to the nation; they have also been largely ineffective in their stated goal of improving our domestic security. Despite the government’s heavy-handed immigration tactics, many of the September 11 terrorists would probably be admitted to the United States today.

[…]Our 18-month-long review of post-September 11 immigration measures determined that:

• The U.S.government overemphasized the use of the immigration system;
• As an antiterrorism measure, immigration enforcement is of limited effectiveness; and
• Arresting a large number of noncitizens on grounds not related to domestic security only gives the nation a false sense of security.

[…]Many of the government’s post-September 11 immigration actions have been poorly planned and have undermined their own objectives. For example, the goals of the special call-in registration program have been contradictory: gathering information about nonimmigrants present in the United States, and deporting those with immigration violations. Many nonimmigrants have rightly feared they will be detained or deported if they attempt to comply, so they have not registered.

Our research also found serious problems at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that are hampering our nation’s counterterrorism efforts and damaging other key national interests. The State Department has tried for 10 years to get access to FBI information to add to its terrorist watchlists; those discussions are still going on. Automating this process would help to overcome long delays in visa approvals that are damaging U.S. political and economic relations abroad. It would also allow agencies to focus on a more in-depth risk assessment of visa applicants who raise legitimate security concerns.

Here are some highlights about the people detained after September 11:

Unlike the hijackers, the majority of noncitizens detained since September 11 had significant ties to the United States and roots in their communities. Of the detainees for whom relevant information was available, over 46 percent had been in the United States at least six years. Almost half had spouses, children, or other family relationships in the United States.

The post-September 11 detainees suffered exceptionally harsh treatment. Many were detained for weeks or months without charge or after a judge ordered them released. Of the detainees for whom such information was available, nearly 52 percent were subject to an “FBI hold,” keeping them detained after a judge released them or ordered them removed from the United States. More than 42 percent of detainees were denied the opportunity to post bond. Many of the detainees were subjected to solitary confinement, 24-hour lighting of cells, and physical abuse.

Many of the detainees were incarcerated because of profiling by ordinary citizens, who called government agencies about neighbors, coworkers, and strangers based on their ethnicity, religion, name, or appearance.

Most important, immigration arrests based upon tips, sweeps, and profiling have not resulted in any terrorism-related convictions against these detainees. Of the four detainees in our sample who had terrorism-related charges brought against them, all four were arrested based on traditional investigative techniques, not as the result of immigration enforcement initiatives.

Finally,we found an important international echo effect from domestic immigration policy. By targeting Muslim and Arab immigrants the U.S. government has deepened the perception abroad that the United States is anti-Muslim and that its democratic values and principles are hypocritical. This echo effect is undermining U.S. relationships with exactly the moderate, pro-Western nations and social groups whom we need in our fight against terrorism.

They also have a number of recommendations covering congressional oversight and legislation, information sharing and analysis, due process and immigration procedure issues, law enforcement programs, national unity, and foreign policy.

Now, I do believe that the government should act against illegal immigration. But there are two major problems with how the administration has handled this issue.

• Selective targeting of Muslims and Arabs: Any selective enforcement of the law is generally bad.
• The administration has given the impression that this enforcement of immigration law is necessary for national security reasons. That is hogwash in my opinion as is made clear in this report. Enforcing immigration law is by itself a good thing but the way it has been done since September 11, 2001 has done nothing for our national security.